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I. Urban Peak Problems
One would think that investigations of peak phenomena should be
at the very heart of urban transportation studies:The rhythm of
urban traffic movements occurs daily, is predictable within very fine
limits, is extremely pronounced in many instances, arid causes high
costs, confusion, and congestion.It primarily affects passenger trans-
portation to and from work and is therefore a rich source of irritations
and complaints. En fact, peak-hour commuter service may be regarded
as the great underdeveloped area of the entire transportation industry.'
Clearly, something needs to be done and yet so far little systematic
attention has been given to this core problem. Zettel and CarIl point
out that most of the contemporary metropolitan studies mention it
only in passing:
The Pittsburgh report is somewhat philosophical about the congestion
problem: "When these many movements overlap in time and space, and there
are too few travel facilities, crowding and traffic congestion result. This is an
almost inevitable result of growth and progress. Who would want to empty
streets and sidewalks?" Or, as the Chicago study says: "There is natural
NOTE: SectionI,"The Relevance of Economics," of the author's original version
containeddiscussion of sociology, urban planning and othersubjectswhich, while
of considerable interest, were not deemed particularly relevant in the present volume.
This partofthepaper wastherefore deletedtoconservespace, byeditorial decision,
but is available uponrequest fromthe author.
1 "Longrange planners, government officials, and members of the general public
alike may reasonably ask why a technology capable of producing jet passenger
aircraft, manned satellites, hydrofoil ships, nuclear-powered ocean vessels, and a
great array of complex weapons can not also be called upon to do something rather
handsome for the weary and long-suffering commuter." Clark Henderson, New
Concepts for Mass Transit, Stanford Research Institute, Long Range Planning
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competition for the use of highway and mass transportation facilities,"
adding, "people are bound to get in one another's way." But f.ew attempts are
made in these studies to consider whether congestion is in fact worsening, or
is being reduced, by the current efforts to provide and maintain transport
services. ... Thereis notably lacking in these studies—both in the initial
statements and in final reports that have been made—any extensive analysis
of the development of congestion over time.2
With this general background in mind, the writer wishes to discuss
briefly some current research on the economics of peaks.3 The purpose
is not so much to report on definitive findings, but rather to outline
promising approaches.It is hoped that this will stimulate scholarly
interest in the field.
PEAK PHENOMENA
Extreme diurnal peak demand patterns can be observed throughout
transportation: they are manifested by vehicles on freeways, passengers
in subways or buses, people in terminal lobbies, aircraft parked at
gate positions or using runways for take-off and landing.But they
are also quite common elsewhere; for example, in telephone, electric
power, gas and water systems, retail establishments, hotels.Daily
peak patterns are widespread throughout the economy.
Peak patterns are best portrayed by means of graphs.Figure1
shows just one day's results of traffic counts which Richard Carl! and
Wolfgang Homburger, of the Institute of Transportation and Traffic
Engineering, University of California, have been carrying out at
strategic locations in the Bay Area since April 1959. The westbound
peak into San Francisco reached almost 40,000 people per hour in the
morning, but the eastward, homebound peak in the afternoon is
sharper still, with a flow rate of 45,000 people per hour.
Note that if shorter intervals were chosen for measurement and
diagrammatical representation, for example, ten minutes or five minutes,
the peak patterns would be even more extreme.4 Within limits, peak
2RichardM. Zettel and Richard R. CarIl, Summary Review of Ma/or Metro-
politanTransportation Studies in the United Stales, Theinstitute of Transportation
and Traffic Engineering, Berkeley, 1962, p. 21.
TubE. Kuhn, Charles A.Hedges,and David C. King, TheEconomics of Peaks:
Concepts,Statistical Toolsandthe Example of Electric Power, Technical Report,
Institute of Transportation and Traffic Engineering, Berkeley (forthcoming).
"Each weekday morning between the hours of 7:00 and 10:00, 1,430,000 people
go to work in Mid-Manhattan. This large volume of individual travel trips con-
verging in the 7.9 square-mile area during peak periods establishes the capacity
requirements for the physical facilities .... Theseverity of the peaking problem can
best be appreciated by examining the critical ten-minute periods.Between 8:55
and 9:04, 20% of the workers in Mid-Manhattan arrive at their jobs, while 32%TRANSPORTATION PLANNING IN URBAN AREAS 299
extremes are a function of the time interval chosen for observation.
Traffic flows look rather tame when they are expressed as annual or
average daily volumes as is done in the majority of reports. Dramatic
fluctuations of the type shown in Figure 1 occur on many traffic ar-
teries, five days a week, year after year, in practically all the large
cities on the globe, whenever people go to work and return home.
STATISTICAL DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS
Among the most useful mathematical concepts in peak research are:
1. For descriptions of fluctuations: cycle (a periodic movement in a
time-series);oscillation (fluctuation about the mean value of the
series);amplitude (the value of the ordinate at its peak or trough
taken from some mean value or trend line); peak (the maximum value
of a periodically varying quantity during a cycle; a high point in the
course of development, especially as represented on a graph).
2. Measures of central tendency:the familiar arithmetic mean,
median, and mode.
3. Measures of dispersion: average deviation, variance, and relative
dispersion.
4. Measures of skewness and peakedness:negative and positive
skewness, kurtosis (measure of "peakedness" of a curve).
5. Demand and capacity concepts:load factor (the ratio of the
average load to the peak load); capacity (a difficult and ambiguous
concept;it is generally interpreted as "maximum output," or "rated
output," or "maximum output under prescribed performance con-
ditions");capacity factor (the ratio of average load to capacity);
utilization factor (the ratio of peak load to capacity).
SOME APPLICATIONS AND FINDINGS5
Analyses of diurnal traffic cycles on the San Francisco-Oakland Bay
Bridge, were made with the quarterly data collected and tabulated by
Messrs. Carli and Homburger. Some of the findings were: On the
Bay Bridge, "oscillation" is a high percentage of "amplitude"; a 3:00
to 4:00 a.m. count may yield fewer than 200 vehicles, but volumes of
depart during the period 4:55—5:04....Itis important to note that head-
quarters offices and service industries, which give rise to the sharpest rush-hour
peaks, are the activities which are expanqing most rapidly in Mid-Manhattan.
As professional, administrative and clerical functions continue to expand, we must
look forward to experiencing greater peaks, with all the associated problems of
congestion." New York-New Jersey Transportation Agency, JourneytoWork,
New York and Trenton, 1963, p. 18.
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over 7,000 vehicles in onedirectionhave been attained during an evening
peak hour.
On the Bay Bridge, peaks are obviously "suppressed." Peaks have
been spreading into the earlier and later hours of the rush period as
congestion discourages drivers from traveling at the time most convenient
to their personal schedule. Over the years, the high portions of the
traffic volume curves have therefore changed from "leptocurtic" (sharp,
peaked), into "platycurtic" (flat-topped) shapes.
The electric power industry has always been greatly concerned with
peak problems and has developed more advanced concepts and so-
lutions than other technologies.There is a remarkable difference,
however, between the approach to peak demand of electric power and
that of highway transport industries. Electric power companies are
prepared, perhaps under the edict of regulatory authorities, to meet
absolute peaks if necessary.Strenuous efforts are made to avoid
"brownouts." They may, however, take steps to discourage peak use
(through interruptable power contracts) and to encourage off-peak use
(through various inducements). In the highway field, however, peak
demand suppression occurs regularly.It is not even clear what degrees
of suppression are regarded as tolerable or intolerable from the tech-
nical, economic and community points of view.6 Some highway bridge
authorities encourage peak use through cheaper commuter tickets.
There is debate on the meaning of "highway capacity." One recent
technical report7 on the Bay Bridge derives annual capacity from as-
sumptions on hourly lane capacity and the proportion of total daily
traffic represented by peak-hour traffic.For example, the Bay Bridge
capacity is assumed to be 1,500 vehicles per lane per hour, or 7,500
vehicles in the peak direction. The annual capacity is then 45 million
vehicles. But if a capacity of 1,800 vehicles per lane per hour is stipu-
lated, the annual capacity of the Bridge would be as much as 54 million
6TheAmerican Association of State Highway Officials states: "A freeway is
intended for the rapid movement of large volumes of traffic with safety and efficiency
but it seldom is feasible to provide facilities with a capacity to accommodate
the peak-hour volumes at such speeds so that the running speeds at such times are
lower. Thus, the freeway design speed should reflect the desired running speed
during nonpeak hours, but not so high as to be wasteful since a large portion of
vehicles are accommodated during periods of peak flow when lower speeds are
acceptable." AASHO, A Policy on Arterial Highways in Urban Areas, Washington,
D.C., 1957, p. 120. (There is no indication what the meanings of the terms "feasible,"
"desired," "wasteful" and "acceptable" are.)
Coverdale and Colpitts, Report on Traffic on the Existing San Francisco Bay
Crossings and the Proposed Potrero Point-Alameda Crossing, Sierra Point-Roberts
Landing Crossing, San Francisco-Mann Crossing, New York, September 1962,
pp. 13—14.302 TRANSPORTATION PLANNING IN URBAN AREAS
vehicles. A more even distribution of the traffic over the hours of the
day and a flattening of the peaks would also increase the capacity
estimates. Two frequently found definitions are "practièal capacity"
(under which drivers experience no "unreasonable" delay, hazard or
freedom to maneuver) and "possible capacity" (maximum traffic
volume observed).
The bridge load factor (defined as the ratio of mean hourly traffic to
maximum hourly traffic) runs around 33 per cent.This indicates a
very poor utilization of facilities compared with the power system
which has a load factor of 75 to 80 per cent.
Average and standard deviations were found to be 1,100 and 1,500
vehicles per hour, resulting in relative dispersions of 65 to 87 per cent
when compared with mean hourly traffic flows of 2,200 to 2,500 vehicles
per hour. This shows the erratic character of bridge traffic as between
times of day. The same measures show that electric energy demand is a
great deal more stable.
Results were also obtained for bus passengers and for heavy truck
traffic on the transbay routes. The number of bus passengers is par-
ticularly susceptible to high fluctuations.Load factors of less than
10 per cent, utilization factors of 90 to 96 per cent (taking capacity as
the maximum number of hourly passengers recorded since April 1959),
and relative dispersions of over 200 per cent were recorded for an
October day in 1961. Heavy truck utilization of the Bay Bridge was not
analyzed in the same manner, but work done by Caril and Homburger
indicates that truckers try to avoid peak hours. The truck peak occurs
immediately after the auto peak in both directions; trucks account
for less than 10 per cent of the total traffic during the auto peak.
A summary comparison of findings on electric power and bridge




(per cent) (per cent) (per cent)
Bridge westbound 33 93 74
Bridge eastbound 32 98 71
Electricity 73 86 24
Summer Demand, 1961
Bridge westbound 37 90 66
Bridge eastbound 35 93 65
Electricity 82 97 19TRANSPORTATION PLANNING IN URBAN AREAS 303
The poor load factors of the Bay Bridge and the erratic fluctuations of
traffic on it are noteworthy.it must be mentioned, though, that the
electric power figures, which were compiled for the Pacific Gas and
Electric system, may look unduly favorable. Regional power demands,
for example during the summer for air conditioning and water pumping
in the agricultural San Joaquin Valley, or during the winter in the
industrial-residential Bay Area, may show much more extreme peaks.
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO URBAN PEAK PROBLEMS
The foregoing demonstrates that peak phenomena can be subjected
to quantitative, statistical research. The studies can readily be extended
to other technologies, for example to telephone, teletype, and data
transmission networks;air transport;and gas and water supply
systems. Leads and lags in peak patterns could be investigated; in the
morning there are probably successive "waves" of peak uses to be
observed on the airport access road, at the aircraft gate positions, the
terminal building, runways, and in the air.Long-range trends can be
examined and forecasts of peak behavior can be attempted: Are peaks
getting "worse"? To what extent are they being suppressed? Sup-
posing capacity had to be provided, what would unsuppressed peaks
be like on urban freeways?
It is certainly possible to measure and predict the "lifebeat of the
metropolis" in various ways.But the really challenging task is to
devise rational, economically efficient ways of dealing with peak
phenomena. Some tentative suggestions can be put forward.
1. Peakpricing. Therehas been considerable economic discussion
on how to charge peak users. As is to be expected, the conclusions
suggest that those who demand high-cost peak facilities, should pay
more than off-peak customers. One would [ike to suggest that rather
different questions ought also to be considered.First, urban dwellers
do not become peak users for their own amusement, especially not the
hapless commuters. Millions of urban workers are virtually compelled
to be at a certain place at a certain time for reasons which are inherent
in the general rhythm of urban life and the functioning of the urban
economy. High peak-use charges may simply impose penalties on a
particularly vulnerable segment of the population. At the same time,
appropriate pricing regimes would discourage nonessential peak
traffic and shift it into off-peak hours.Better utilization of transport
facilities would be the desirable result.
2. Planningpeakservice facilities. We must ask how the capacities
of the peak facilities are determined in the first place. Are some—for304 TRANSPORTATION PLANNING IN URBAN AREAS
example, freeways—deliberately built to less than absolute peak de-
mands? If so, why? What is the economic rationale of the rule of
thumb in highway engineering to cater to the thirtieth highest hourly
traffic volume in a year, rather than to provide some other level of
service? Why are other technologies geared to handle extreme peak
loads? These and related questions probe into the fundamentals of
long-range investment decisions under oscillating demand conditions.
Pricing, by contrast, pertains more to short-range actions once the
plant scale has been determined. In military terminology, we may say
that investment is economic strategy and pricing represents economic
tactics. The relation of both to peak problems is a most promising
research area.
3. The space and time economies of the metropolis. We know ab-
solutely nothing about the precise economies that are obtained by
assembling people, messages, and objects in time and space (the execu-
tive, his secretary, the mail, and telephone calls are all brought together
at the office at 9 o'clock in the morning). Conversely, we know nothing
about the diseconomies of shifting these components of economic
activity out of phase.Big cities, especially London and New York,
have for years experimented with staggered working hours in the
central business district.What have been the trade-offs between
diminished business efficiency and enhanced urban transport per-
formance?
4. Encouragement of transport services with good peak performance.
In some respects private passenger cars are rather poor vehicles for
carrying people in and out of central areas during peak hours. No
other medium requires as much precious urban space per passenger
for movement and storage;speed and safety performance is disap-
pointing for highly peaked mass movements; nonmarket costs (air
pollution) are high. Figure 1 provides a dramatic illustration of how
much more efficient buses are for the purpose.It would be interesting
to calculate how many millions of dollars in bridge investment would
be necessary if the transbay buses were replaced by automobiles and
the same peak-hour performance had to be maintained. Other transport
means yet to be introduced or invented may be superior still to buses.
It should be the prime function of urban transport investment analysis
to ferret out and encourage these alternatives.
5. Making peak transport demand unnecessary. What is the pos-
sibility of rearranging urban land-use patterns in such a way as to cut
down on peak movements? Are there substitutes to be found outside
the transportation industry for physical movements of people? CouldTRANSPORTATION PLANNING IN URBAN AREAS 305
messagetransmissions (telephone, videophone, closed television cir-
cuits) replace face-to-face meetings?Could the business executive
of tomorrow operate out of his suburban home with the aid of exotic
communications devices?
II. investment Analyses for Urban Transportation
It is not possible within the context of this paper to develop a complete
analytical framework for urban transportation planning.The ex-
cellent review of study methods by Richard M. Zettel and Richard R.
Cant should be consulted.8 Urban transportation economics proper
can conveniently be seen as part of public enterprise economics; this
broader field has attracted increasing attention recently and some of the
works will be of interest.9 We will discuss items of special interest
only here.
TER MINO LOGY
Urban transportation, and in fact the whole field of public enterprise
economics, is burdened by confusing terminology.Agreement on
clear definitions of the things to be analyzed would alone be a step
forward.
First, this writer wishes to express dissatisfaction with the term
"benefit-cost analysis," which is quite commonly used.It can be
traced back to the FloodControlAct of 1936 which interpreted project
feasibility to mean that "the benefits, to whomsoever they may accrue,
are in excess of the estimated costs." Since then, four distinct aspects
have become associated with benefit-cost comparisons.
1. All benefits, no matter how widely dispersed throughout the
economy, must be credited to the project.
A wide analytical viewpoint is certainly desirable.En urban trans-
portation studies, the point of reference should be set at the level of the
metropolitan economy. But the analysis must not be restricted to the
measurement of favorable effects only.All costs, regardless of how
remote their incidence is, ought to be traced as well. Many so-called
highway benefit studies credit land value increases to adjacent road
development, forgetting the corresponding relative decreases in prop-
erty values elsewhere. Other undesirable consequences, such as smog,
accidents, noise, and scenic blight, are also often overlooked. There
Zetteland Caril, Summary Review.
Titto E.Kuhn,Public Enterprise Economics and Transport Problems, Berkeky,
1962.(In the Appendix of this book there is a "Summary Comparison of Analytical
Procedures and Criteria Proposed in Prominent Public Enterprise Documents.")306 TRANSPORTATION PLANNING IN URBAN AREAS
has further been a tendency to double count highway benefits which
were simply transfers from one party to another.'°
2. All benefits and costs of a project, whether they can be expressed in
money terms or not, must be considered in the analyses.
Again there is agreement that all relevant evidence, whether it fits
into the economist's special domain or not, ought to be studied. How-
ever, a clear distinction should be made between market and non-
market values. The latter, while largely falling outside pure economics,
must not be neglected in favor of the former.It is also misleading,
arbitrarily, to convert nonmarket effects—highway accident deaths,
time savings, comfort—into dollars and cents, as has been done in
many highway benefit studies.
3. Benefit-cost studies provide scientific guidance for user charging
and, hence, for resource allocation in transportation.
Neither of these laudable objectives has been achieved by benefit-cost
studies to date.In the literature there is widespread confusion about
the adherence of transport pricing to the minimum boundary condition
(cost of providing the service), or to the maximum one (benefit, value,
or utility derived from use), or to some intermediate position. The
Final Report of the Highway Cost Allocation Study, for example,
blindly averages conflicting results of unrelated cost and benefit for-
mulae, some of them of questionable validity. The Final Report as
much as admits that five years of research were in vain by inviting the
policy makers to take their pick among the results:
Although it is believed that the use of these findings will assist in developing
a reasonable allocation of Federal-aid highway costs among those who
occasion them and reap their benefits, the fact that they were achieved by a
mediation between differing results emphasizes the truth that in the field of
cost allocation indisputable accuracy of findings is not possible. The report
concludes that definitive answers to questions of cost allocation between users
and non-users cannot be reached solely through analysis. These answers are
ultimately matters of policy.'1
10TheFinal Report of theso-calledSection210Study states, in one of its better
passages, "The benefits of highway improvement, spread out like ripples from a
stone dropped in a stream, and in some respects are as elusive as quicksilver.
Only by an elaborate input-output analysis, on an interregional and interindustry
basis, for which techniques are not now available, would it [be] possible to make
any sort of approximation of the totality of nonuser benefits that will be brought
about by the. .. program."U.S. Congress, Final Report of the Cost
Allocation Study, House Document No. 54, Washington, D.C., 1961, P. 31.
11Ibid., p.4. The Final Report offers to the policy makers the following "range of
required payments based on study findings" for a diesel tractor-semitrailer and full
trailer combination: low—$273.26 per annum; high—$3,553.20 (Table 1-3, p. 17).
The suggested payment ranges for other vehicle types are less extreme. But of whct
possible policy use can findings of this sort be?It should be noted that their
spurious accuracy extends to single cents.TRANSPORTATION PLANNING IN URBAN AREAS 307
On the second point, there is no guarantee at all that a meticulous
transport pricing regime will automatically bring about the right in-
vestment decisions for the future. Pricing, as evidence of current con-
sumers' acceptance of the service under the usual monopoly conditions,
provides partial guidance only for planning;it becomes rather ir-
relevant when the investments under consideration mature five or ten
years from now.
Public transport enterprises are further in the strange position that the
customers (highway or rapid transit users) are also, as citizens and
voters, the shareholders. Users pay for services consumed, but simul-
taneously they also put up capital investment funds. For example,
motorists constantly invest gasoline taxes in the Interstate Highway
System.It is often glibly assumed that urban transport investments
which are "financially feasible" are also economically justified and
socially desirable.But the availability of funds, especially under the
present complex structure of intergovernmental aids and grants, is no
reliable guide to planning decisions in the urban sphere. If coordinated
urban transport planning is to be taken seriously, it will require co-
ordinated physical, economic, financial, and fiscal planning.These
phases cannot be separately pursued.
4. The only correct public investment planning tool is the benefit-
cost ratio.
This notion must be rejected.There are other decision-making
criteria which will perform much more satisfactorily.Benefit-cost
ratios have a number of fundamental defects, and often rather suspect
procedures have been used to arrive at them. In particular, the treat-
ment of the time dimension has often been incorrect, interest has been
neglected, time spans have been set unrealistically long, no diligent
search for alternative solutions has been carried out.
In view of the checkered history and doubtful scientific reputation
of some benefit-cost studies, it may be desirable to banish this ex-
pression from the urban transportation scene.Intellectually, future
analyses should be firmly anchored to the economic theory of invest-
ment.The term "investment analyses for urban transportation"
may therefore be appropriate. There is no reason for continuing to
regard benefit-cost studies as a separate body of analytical techniques
in economics.
The rest of the terminology also needs weeding out. The current
literature offers a jungle of project effects which are supposed to be
analyzed: pecuniary and nonpecuniary, internal and external, private
and social, nontransfer and transfer, on-site and off-site, direct and
indirect,market and extra-market, economic and noneconomic,
measurable and nonmeasurable, monetary and nonmonetary, tangible308 TRANSPORTATION PLANNING IN URBAN AREAS
and intangible, direct and spill-over, individual and collective, primary
and secondary.
It is suggested that a simple three-tier classification of effects is all
that is needed:
1. Costs (all undesirable effects of actions; inputs;sacrifices) vs.
gains (desirable effects; outputs; rewards). In private enterprise in-
vestment analysis these terms would correspond to cash costs and cash
revenues.In urban transportation studies a much broader inter-
pretation is necessary.
2. Market vs. nonmarket costs and gains. This is a simple distinction
between effects which are satisfactorily expressed by market prices
according to the economist's rule book, and those which are not.
3. Internal vs.external, costs and gains.This distinction arises
entirely from the viewpoint adopted for the analysis: external effects
are ignored, internal ones are considered. A public viewpoint compels
study of all costs and gains within the area of jurisdiction—there are
no external effects by definition.
Suppose the viewpoint is that of the San Francisco Bay Area metro-
politan region, and a scenic parkway is under study. The additional
tourist trade this facility generates would be an internal market gain
to the metropolitan economy; its contribution to urban aesthetics, an
internal nonmarket gain; the fatal accidents attributable to it, internal
nonmarket costs; and the losses sustained by the hotel trade in Los
Angeles, external market costs.
In this way, rather complex repercussions can be arranged systemati-
cally, precluding double counting, omissions, and confusion.
PROJECT SELECTION CRITERIA
The urban transportation analyst will be confronted by projects with
diverse cost and gain patterns extending over time.It is generally
agreed that discounting to present values is a convenient method for
reducing these complex time profiles into flat images as it were. The
standard discounting formulae are well known and need not be re-
peated here. Applying them, we obtain the present values of a series
of gains, V, and of a series of costs, C, when both are discounted at
a rate roverthe functionally useful life of the project.
The most basic project selection test then is:accept projects if
VC, reject if V <C.There is a mild controversy over the choice
of the discount rate. Some claim that rshouldbe determined within
the project planning process itself; for example, it might be the internal
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into the program.Others, this writer included, suggest than an ex-
ternally derived market rate of interest or social rate of time preference
is appropriate. But otherwise there is unanimity that the basic accept-
rejecttestissound.Even the benefit-cost ratio proponents are
accommodated.Their fundamental selection rule is:Carry out all
projects which have a benefit-cost ratio of at. least unity, reject all those
with a lesser ratio. That is to say, accept projects if V/C1, reject
if V/C < 1. The two tests amount to exactly the same thing, of course.
Suppose a whole program consisting of a number of projects has to
be chosen. What is the correct decision-making criterion? Some, the
author among them, say that for the program as a whole maximization
of VC, or maximization of the present value of net gains, yields
the best results. Others say that the project with the highest V/C ratio
deserves first consideration, the one with the next highest ratio should
come second, and so on, until the program is complete.
On reflection it becomes apparent that both procedures lead to
identical results if there are no other constraints. When all projects
with V/C1 are included in the program, the program as a whole
will also show maximum V —C.Consequently, the involved process
of arranging projects on a list by degrees of preference is really quite
redundant.
Frequently, mutually exclusive alternatives have to be compared in
transportation investment planning. Different designs or locations are
technically possible, but one and only one solution is to be carried out.
How should the best project be selected?
Here again, some advocate maximization of V —C,others max-
imization of V/C, as the correct selection criterion. We can demon-
strate the virtues of both of these by working through an example
contained in the AASHO report on Road User Benefit Cost Analyses
for Highway Improvements.12This manual, despite numerous theo-
retical and practical shortcomings, still has a considerable following
among members of the highway profession.
We need not examine the rationale of AASHO's gain and cost figures
since we are only interested in the method of project choice. As shown
in Table I, alternate plan 1 (the existing condition) means doing nothing
at all: annual highway costs would stay at $19,800 and annual road
user costs (defined as the costs of operating motor vehicles) at $411,600.
Alternate plans 2 to 6 represent varioUs highway improvement projects,
12AmericanAssociation of State Highway Officials, Road User Benefit Analyses
for Hzçhway Improvements, Washington, D.C., 1960. (1952 report without basic
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each resulting in its particular set of highway and road user costs.
Only one plan can be carried out. Which one should it be?
AASHO correctly compares the additional road improvement costs
(C in our terminology) with the savings in vehicle costs (V). But use of
the benefit-cost ratio as a selection criterion leads to complex cal-
culations.In the first round, alternate plans, 2, 3, and 4 "all show
justification of a high order," but plan 2, with the highest V/C ratio
of 22.8, would seem to be the most preferred. However, when plan 2
is put in as the basic condition, "the extra costs of plans 3 and 4 show
justification, the latter to a high extent." Hence, AASHO concludes,
alternate plan 4, which emerges with a high V/C ratio of 7.3 in the
second round, should be selected. Plan 3 is inferior to 4, and plans 5
and 6 can be rejected outright as they show benefit-cost ratios of <1
in the second round.
Applying our selection criterion of maximum V —Cto AASHO's
basic data, we get exactly the same result with much less trouble:
Alternate Gains Costs Net Gains
Plan V C V—C
2 $54,900 $2,400 $52,500
3 56,800 3,300 53,500
4 75,400 5,200 70,200
5 59,500 9,400 50,100
6 59,000 9,900 49,100
As can be seen, alternate plan 4 maximizes V —Cand should be
chosen.
It is possible to apply another variation of the V —Cmaximization
criterion to the AASHO data and still arrive at the same conclusion.
According to the AASHO publication, the value to the community
at large of accommodating a certain volume of highway traffic may be
called V. The exact magnitude, in dollars and cents, of performing
this function is not given by AASHO. However, it appears that V
stays the same no matter which alternate highway improvement plan
is adopted. Highways and motor vehicles can then be regarded as two
factors of production which have to be combined in certain proportions
to yield the desired highway transportation services. Highway costs,
must be added to motor vehicle costs, Cm,toarrive at total costs
of highway transportation, C.Alternate plans1to 6,therefore,
represent different admixtures of the two factors of production, each
with its particular magnitude of C.312 TRANSPORTATION PLANNING IN URBAN AREAS
Motor Total
High way Vehicle Transportation
Alternate Costs Costs Costs
Plan Ch Cm CCh+Cm
1 $19,800 $411,600 $434,400
2 22,200 356,700 378,900
3 23,100 354,800 377,900
4 25,000 336,200 361,200
5 29,200 352,100 381,300
6 29,700 352,600 382,300
WithV fixed, the problem becomes one of straightforward cost min-
imization. Alternate plan 4, which results in the lowest combination
of highway and vehicle costs, is obviously the best solution.
Either way, then, maximization of V —Cprovides us with a simple,
effective, and unambiguous criterion for correct project choice. The
AASHO method, on the other hand, necessitates calculations of first,
second, and possibly further benefit-cost ratios. There is no virtue in
using this approach for choices among mutually exclusive alternatives.
Benefit-cost ratios have the further drawback that elaborate ac-
counting rules must be followed in listing effects as gains or costs,
otherwise distorted ratios are obtained.This is a serious handicap
in highway analyses where the effects of positive costs (highway ex-
penditures) may be conceived either as positive gains (user benefits)
or as negative costs (savings in motor vehicle costs), as we have seen
in Table 1.Following the maximization of V —Crule, these book-
keeping details are of no significance and a correct answer is obtained
every time.13
RANKING AND BUDGET CONSTRAINTS
The controversial concepts of "project ranking" or "project priorities"
need to be examined carefully.Suppose, once again, that a whole
program of several projects has to be submitted for approval to a top
decision-making body, for example, to Congress, to a budget committee,
or to a planning authority. We must assume that the proposed projects
have already passed the VC test.Ideally, all of them should
therefore be endorsed immediately. Any deletions or delays would
Benefit-costratios also perform badly when there are complementary and
competitive relationships among projects. These are quite common in the urban
transport sphere;for example, the cross effects which freeways, feeder roads,
subways, parking garages, and bus lines exercise upon each other. Such network or
systems phenomena are discussed in detail in Tillo E. Kuhn, Public Enterprise, pp.
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mean loss of net gains. But the decision-makers, for reasons of their
own, wish to trim the whole program down. It is therefore necessary,
so writers on the subject claim, to arrange the projects on a priority
basis in order of descending benefit-cost ratios. The decision-makers
would then be able to first eliminate projects at the bottom of the list,
gradually working their way to higher benefit-cost ratios until they
have cut the program to the desired size.
This whole process, as described, is a little baffling. Basically, we are
really concerned with a simple "accept or reject" choice: projects can
only be either definitely "in" or definitely "out" of the program. Yet
ranking implies that there are shades of being "in" or "out," subtle
degrees of being accepted or rejected. If the ranking problem is stated
in this way, it doesn't make sense. Additional circumstances have to be
brought in to make it realistic.
1. Ranking over time. Most appealing is to regard ranking as an
ordering in time; that is, once a priority list exists, project 1 would be
done first, project 2 a little later, and so on. For example, construction
companies might not have the capacity to cope with numerous projects
all at once. Or if they expanded their capacity, there might be a danger
of "feast and famine" cycles in construction activity. The decision-
makers, with revenues coming in gradually throughout the year, may
also prefer a more balanced pattern of project expenditures for financial
reasons.
How can ranking over time be handled analytically? This is really
a mathematical exercise in testing how much we gain and lose by
shifting the starting dates of various projects backward and forward in
time. Suppose there are twelve projects which all show VC, and
each costs $1 million.The decision-makers have approved a total
annual program of $12 million, with one project starting every month.
Here the correct method would be to try to maximize V —Cfor the
program as a whole under these particular conditions. A trial-and-error
approach is needed, if the cost and gain profiles of the individual
projects are irregular.
Is it possible to use a V/C ranking if both gains and costs are ex-
pressed in present values? If the gain and cost profiles of the various
projects have the same basic pattern, such ratios can be employed for
determining priorities over time: the highest V/C ratio project should
come first, and so on. It should be noted that in many cases net gains
will grow at faster compound interest rates than the rate assumed for
discounting purposes. When this occurs, the growth rate of the nu-
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denominator. Hence, such projects would show larger V/C ratios as they
are postponed over time.However, maximization of V —Cwould
still be a less ambiguous project selection tool under the circumstances.
2. Budget constraint. Of importance also is the notion, frequently
encountered in the water resource economics literature, that the
decision-makers arrive at varying budget limits by some magical
processes which are quite unrelated to the sizes and merits of the
programs submitted by the analysts.Hence, lists of ranked projects
must be made available, so that appropriate cut-off points satisfying
the budget limits can be determined.
Once more, this procedure does not seem satisfactory. If there is an
arbitrary budget limit—arbitrary in the sense that it was not arrived at
with the aid of analysis—then in effect we are confronted with a con-
strained C.If so, then the V's for the program as a whole should be
maximized in relation to the given C.If the budgeting process is
fickle and there are several possible constrained C's, alternative pro-
grams must be worked out for each one of them, still following the
criterion of maximizing V —C.The correct method under the cir-
cumstances is to compose the different programs with the aid of various
discount rates: a high rate would ration out many projects and would
therefore result in a conservative program; a low rate would have the
opposite effect.
The most disturbing feature of arbitrary budget setting is this:it
seems to treat the specified sum of C as practically costless—the money
is earmarked and must be spent no matter how big or small the V's
obtained; but any amount of proposed expenditure that exceeds the
specified budget becomes infinitely costly no matter how large the
potential additional V's may be.In other words, a completely ar-
bitrary step function for the cost of money prevails, with the C con-
straint suddenly rising from zero to infinity.But in good budget
planning there should really be gradually increasing penalties on
larger programs. Such a smooth rationing effect can best be achieved
by upward adjustment in the discount rate, for example from 4 to 5 to
6 per cent. This would be comparable to the rising interest costs faced
by private enterprises in the money market, when larger and larger
loans are sought.
It is suggested, in conclusion, that the ranking and budget constraint
problems in urban transportation can be tackled intelligently.First,
budgets ought to be based on well-prepared investment analyses;
there is something wrong with the institutional arrangements if budgets
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nevertheless a fact of life, then the program size should be fitted to
the constrained C by varying the discount rate; if there is great disparity
between the resulting discount rate and, say, the market interest rate
in the private sector, this will at least be a signal to the decision-makers
that there is something wrong with their budget constraint.Third,
ranking over time can be determined by analytically postponing or
advancing individual projects; maximization of V —Cfor the program
as a whole is the correct criterion.
OTHER CONSTRAINTS AND CRITERIA
Frequently distinctions are made in urban transportation planning
between capital costs (K) and operating costs (0), where total cost
C =K+ 0.institutionally, different constraints are placed upon
K and 0 and this greatly distorts the investment process. Sometimes
K is subjected to budget scrutiny and rigorous analysis, but 0 is un-
constrained because it is assumed that future project operating costs
can be met from future project revenues. Consequently there is great
incentive to substitute 0 for K. Projects with low capital intensity will
be promoted, or planners will try to pass off capital costs as operating
ones; because of the nebulous nature of everyday cost definitions this
is not too difficult.Alternatively, funds for K may come from low-
interest, low-risk, general revenue bonds, whereas 0 has to be found
from possibly meager operating revenues.Here substitutions of K
for 0 are advantageous. Either way, whenever costs are loaded onto
an artificially low-risk, low-interest, source of finance, the economic
balance is disturbed.
Other distortions occur when "foreign aid" 14fromoutside the
region enters into urban transport investment considerations. Usually
federal or state aid is limited to capital investment items. Hence there
is great pressure to favor highly capital intensive projects.In effect,
massive monuments to the future in steel and concrete will be built
with outside funds, even when less durable investments might be
economically more appropriate.
The common practice of federal and state governments to offer
liberal financial aid for urban freeways, especially those which form
part of the interstate or state highway network, but not for other
transportation technologies, has had particularly powerful effects.
In California at the present time as much as 100 per cent of the costs of
urban freeways designated for the interstate Highway System are
Thissomewhat unorthodox term is explained in ibid., pp. 55—57,200—202.316 TRANSPORTATION PLANNING IN URBAN AREAS
borne by the senior governments and over 90 per cent of the construc-
tion costs by the federal government; the remainder, plus all operating
expenses, by the State of California. This formula applies, for example,
to the controversial S180 million, 7.1 mile Western Freeway in San
Francisco, which has been proposed by the State but has not been
accepted locally. From the point of view of the local authorities, this
project would be a gift from the authorities in Washington, D.C. and
Sacramento, were it not for losses of tax revenues from freeway land,
destruction of community and aesthetic values, and so on.
Under these peculiar institutional circumstances'5 it is small wonder
that urban freeways have been sprouting in the big cities all over the
United States and a near miracle that local governments show any
interest at all in alternative solutions, especially rapid transit, which
are not eligible for the same massive "foreign aid" support.The
economist can only strongly urge that senior governments adopt a
policy of complete technological neutrality and offer urban trans-
portation aidwith no strings attached.Otherwise urban transport
investment analyses, complete with benefit-cost studies and the rest,
are a waste of time.
INVESTMENT APPROACHES TO URBAN PEAK PROBLEMS
This becomes an exercise in contrasting economic costs and gains.
Two basic lines of attack are possible.First, it may be possible to
quantify, in market terms, the gains (V) associated with different levels
RichardM. Zettel describes the situation very well:"... inthis nation we have
nevermetfiscal problemsof the lesser units of government through unconditional
revenue-sharing orgrant-in-aidarrangements—whereby the recipients would be
permittedtoallocate funds among their several functions and activities as their
legislative bodies saw fit.instead, the grantor seeks to establish an 'interest' in a
particular functionor activity as justification for the grant; and it thensets conditions
upon use of the grantsothat its 'interest' will be furthered. ...these conditions
conspire toshiftfiscal responsibility upward. And the manner inwhichthis fiscal
responsibility is exercised tends to remove critical decisions on some governmental
activities to a seat rather far removed from the scene of the problems. The grants
take on the nature of 'foreign aid,' to be used or to be lost to the community. But
the community must abide by the conditions.It may think its school problem more
critical than its highway problem, but the highway grant will be spent for highways—
along with local resources if matching is required. And if grants are available for
highways but not for transit, then highway Construction tends to become the finan-
cially feasible 'solution' to the transportation problem even though the community
might prefer to experiment with transit, And since the way is closed to shifting
funds, the dismaying alternative is to seek new grants for new purposes—grants for
education in addition to highway grants; specific grants for transit as a follow-up
to specific grants for highways." Richard M. Zettel, "Public Finance Policy and
Urban Transport," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Society
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of peak performance;for example, for unsuppressed peak service
(the highest V), for a slightly flattened peak (a somewhat lower V) and
a severely curtailed peak demand (the lowest V). This measurement of
the V's is highly problematic, but ingenious researchers may be able
to accomplish it.For example, the uninhibited V would express what
commuters would be prepared to pay if they were conveyed to their
destinations with speed and comfort. Or it might be the total market
gains accruing to the metropolitan economy from such a superb
service. The suppressed V's would then reflect the reduced cash returns
from commuters and/or the lowered efficiency of the metro economy.
Given the different transport cost estimates (C) which correspond with
the various V's (high C would go with high V, low with low), then the
correct selection criterion would again be maximization of V —C.
A more promising approach, in the writer's view, would be to regard
the peak Vas largely nonmeasurable in market terms. The community,
or its representatives, should then clearly specify the desired level of
peak-hour service for everybody in the community. Exact standards
should be set for door-to-door speed, safety, performance, avoidance of
air pollution, external design, etc. The specifications must stress that
urban transportation be seen as a system and be designed from begin-
fling to end.This system must include both private and public in-
strumentalities, of course, as well as all functional components (feeders,
vehicle storage, terminals, transfer facilities, etc.). In view of the back-
ward technological performance of contemporary urban transport
media, it would be a very good idea if the community transport goals
were set rather high.Designers, inventors, systems analysts, and
producers would rise to this challenge, just as they have risen to the
challenge to get a man safely to the moon and back. There is no reason
to be timid in our demands for better urban transport service.
Once the various qualities of peak-hour service have been specified
by collective value judgment, the economist can help to select ap-
propriate design configurations which will minimize C. Various other
economic problems—time paths of accomplishment, trade-offs, supply
and demand trends over time—can also be explored with profit by the
analyst.
PREPONDERANCE OF NONMARKET VALUES
A problem that occurs over and over again in the public sector is the
preponderance of nonmarket values and especially nonmarket gains.
The reasons are familiar and need not be repeated here.It must be
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of economic analysis.16 The various gain and cost items cannot be
aggregated into common money terms.Furthermore, since the rel-
ative market and nonmarket contents of costs and gains will likely
differ, the two series cannot jointly be subjected to the traditional
revenue-cost comparisons and calculations.
Under these circumstances, how can economists still contribute to
better decisions?Fortunately, the costs of typical urban transport
projects consists almost entirely of market items: the dollar outlays
on men, machines, and materials necessary to build and operate these
facilities.If there are distortions in the price signals generated in the
market for transportation supplies, they can be corrected.Further-
more, if pure nonmarket costs are caused by specific projects, they can
be entered as negative nonmarket gains if desired. For example, the
smog from a freeway or the noise nuisance from an elevated rail line
are just as much detractions from existing amenities as they are positive
community costs.If we follow the criterion of maximizing V —C,it
does not matter in which account they end up.
It is then necessary that the urban community or its representatives
specify precisely the level of V for the transportation service.Since V
will be composed of a number of desirable attributes which cannot be
reduced to the common denominator of money, it is essential that they
all be spelled out in detail.The specifications for a comprehensive
urban passenger transportation system might for example be:
1. Under projected land-use conditions, the system must be capable
of conveying peak-hour commuters in less than, say, 30 minutes from
door to door (or in a larger metropolis, perhaps 60 per cent of peak-
hour commuters in less than 30 minutes, 40 per cent in 30 to 60
minutes).
2. The system must adhere to certain stated standards of passenger
comfort and convenience (rates of acceleration and deceleration, seat
availability, air conditioning, etc.).
16Lloyd Rodwin argues that there is a gulf between traditional economics and
physical (city and regional) planning: "This role [of metropolitan planning] cannot
be played by the price system. The difficulties are already manifest in the widespread
concern with urban maladjustments.We know the market for urban land
and improvements is characterized by imperfect knowledge, sluggish or inflexible
adjustments to price signals, and significant discrepancies between public and
private costs. We know, too, that many of the basic decisions on urban develop-
ment are not, and for some practical purposes cannot, be made by the market
mechanism. They involve public policy on the character of land use control systems
and decisions on public investment of capital for urban overhead." Lloyd Rodwin,
"Metropolitan Policy for Developing Areas," Re?ional Economic Plannin.ç'-:Tech-
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3.Thefatal accident rate attributable to the system itself must not
exceed 0.1 per 100 million passenger miles (or some other figure).
4.Thesystem must not exceed stated air pollution tolerances.
5. Large portions of right-of-way must be underground, as shown
on a detailed land-use map.
6. The external design of the facilities must be of high aesthetic
quality and must have the approval of the civic art commission.
7.Flexibilityof routing is an important quality of service aspect.
The number of origin-and-destination, pairs that can be served, as
well as the number of nodes and interchange points, are significant
and should be specified.
Given these and many additional performance standards that can
be thought up, the economist can then help to choose among various
means to achieve these ends. The following aspects lend themselves
particularly to economic analysis:
1. Minimization of C in relation to the given V (or various di-
mensions of V).
2. Research on the increases or decreases of the various components
of V which would result from moving the value of C up and down.
3. Study of the time paths for achieving the specified goals: over-all
progress of the program; priorities for completing geographic segments
of the system and for reaching different functional objectives.
4. Exploration of possible trade-offs between different goals, gains
and costs. For example, more safety vs. less speed; higher aesthetic
quality vs. higher cost; great portions underground vs. less passenger
comfort; more air pollution vs. less cost.
5. Exploration of different technical-economic mixes on the supply
sides:desirable degrees of capital intensity and combinations of
factors of production.
6. Design of performance criteria, checks on operational efficiency.
7.Continuedsurveillance of community preferences over time;
consumers' acceptance of system.
Even though the goals and performance standards of the urban
transportation system will have to be determined largely by collective
value judgments, the economic analyst is not likely to run out of work
in this sphere.
.111. Goals, Choices and Investment Analysis
Clear identification of goals emerges as the most important first step
in any urban transportation plan. Once the ends are stated, means320 TRANSPORTATION PLANNING IN URBAN AREAS
can be sought to achieve them. Up to the present, major metropolitan
transportation studies have spent little time defining ends before
rushing into the phases of data collection, field surveys, and computer
programs.17 In addition, present conditions and attitudes surely are of
only limited use in determining a more desirable future.
Apparently these are general shortcomings of all urban planning.
Davidoff and Reiner make the point in an important article on planning
philosophy.
In each plan, the importance of placing value formulation first cannot be
overstated, though there is great reluctance in urban planning to start with a
search for ends. Even where goal selection is placed first, there is a tendency
to underplay this and return to familiar territory—"survey and analysis."
We do not understand the logic that supports ventures in research before the
objectives of research have been defined. Such emphasis on research is pre-
mised on an ill-founded belief that knowledge of facts will give rise to appro-
priate goals or value judgments. Facts by themselves will not suggest what
would be good or what should be preferred.18
Because value formulation is necessary in urban decision-making,
planning is sometimes identified with arbitrary, undemocratic processes,
manipulated by a few who impose their own preferences on the rest
of the community. If this occurs, then it is, of course, not good plan-
ning.Ideally, planning should make possible more choice and par-
ticularly more intelligent choice than would otherwise be possible.
It is meant to free the community from the tryanny of poor, short-
sighted, selfish, and ill-informed decisions. As Davidoff and Reiner
go on to say, "Values are inescapable elements of any rational decision-
making process or any exercise of choice. Since choice permeates the
whole planning sequence, a clear notion of ends pursued lies at the
heart of the planner's task and the definition of these ends thus must be
given primacy in the planning process."There is no reason why
decisions on values cannot be decentralized, by putting alternatives
before the voters, by informing and educating the citizens, by enlisting
17Regardingthe need for metropolitan transportation studies, Zettel and Caril
state, "... thereview failed to turn up any extensive analysis of the urban transport
problem that the studies were to investigate and help solve. The study prospectuses
usually plunge directly into the technical details of fact gathering and data analysis,
without attempting to define the problems on hand" (Summary Review, p. 20).
Practically all of the studies surveyed state "preparation of a transport plan," or
"formulation of a highway plan" as their basic objectives, without alluding to the
higher-level community objectives that these technical efforts are supposed to
serve (ibid.,pp.25—26).
PaulDavidoff and Thomas A. Reiner, "A Choice Theory of Planning," Journal
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their advice. The purely technical decisions for implementation can
then more safely be centralized.
Urban transportation planning and investment analysis must con-
sequently be regarded primarily as a vehicle for community choices:
preferences must be explored, options must be suggested, different
solutions—even utopian ones—must be pursued. The difficulties are
staggering, for when people decide upon one comprehensive transport
system for their city rather than another one, they significantly affect
the urban way of life.Furthermore, their decisions will typically not
bring results this year or next, but five, ten, or twenty years from now.
Quite a different generation of urban dwellers may feel the full effects.
In essence, the greater the number of alternatives considered and the
more futuristic the outlook, the more powerful transport planning and
analysis will be.Alas, there is as yet little evidence that this general
philosophy prevails in contemporary urban transportation policy and
practice.
COMMENT
BRITTON HARRIS, University of Pennsylvania
I am basically most sympathetic with Kuhn's effort as an economist
to come to grips with the nature of the city and the challenges offered to
economic analysis by urban problems.I perhaps disagree implicitly
with his method of slicing the problem, and, as a planner speaking to
economists, I shall try to suggest some of the ways in which Kuhn's
discussion of applications seem to me to fail to mesh with his attempted
capsulization of first principles.
The urban metropolitan scene offers half a dozen features which are
somewhat intractable under conventional economic analysis.
First, it is pervaded by externalities, with individual actions having
many ramifying effects upon other entities.
Second, many investments, especially in the public sector, are
"lumpy." Associated with this discontinuity of investment decisions
are substantial economies and diseconomies of scale.
Third, the long life of investments in land improvements introduces
rigidities into the market for capital services.Under conditions of
growth, an investment can be optimal for only a narrow point in time,
yet once committed, it is not readily transferable.
Fourth, the great strategic importance of public investments spot-
lights the fact that no market exists for the services of many of these322 TRANSPORTATION PLANNING IN URBAN AREAS
investments, and this lack of a market complicates investment decisions.
Kuhn and Vickrey suggest different approaches by a cost-benefit
analysis and user charges to create a pseudo-market or an actual
market for certain services.
The fifth difficulty centers on the problem of identifying an optimum.
Owing to the wide range of public investment channels and of public
influences on private investment and behavior, many distinct combi-
nations of factors are possible, and these may be widely separated in
what might be called a "policy space." As in the economics of the
farm or the industrial producer, marginal analysis can lead only to a
local optimum.It cannot identify possible structurallydifferent
recombinations of factors which may result in a higher optimum.
The sixth problem arises when, as a result of a combination of
difficulties four and five above, specific individual policies are pursued
and judged independently of their combined effects and possible
substitutes.This type of judgment, it may readily be seen, leads to
suboptimization, wherein one program may tend to run away with
the pattern of metropolitan development. The danger of suboptimi-
zation is particularly serious where one policy operates in a market or
pseudo-market (cost-benefit) framework while its complementary or
competing policies do not. Examples of suboptimization may be found
in highway policy, federal mortgage insurance policy, urban renewal,
and central business district planning.
REPLY inTILL0 E. KUHN
Harrisoffers some interesting and penetrating comments.He
lists several features of urban investment decisions which are, he
says,"somewhat intractable under conventional economic analysis."
Although he seeks to leave the matter of degree in doubt, he conveys
the impression that the pitfalls are fatal to applications of economic
principles.
I am more sanguine than Harris about the potential contributions
of economics. In essence my position is that if conventional economic
analysis—whatever that means—is largely useless in the urban sphere,
let us by all means develop unconventional economic analysis for the
purpose. Otherwise "economics will fade out of this sphere by default,"
as I pointed out in an earlier version of my paper.
To take his easier, more technical points first, that there are ex-
ternalities—lumpiness in investment and time rigidities in the capital
market—is, I feel, fully recognized in my paper and elsewhere. Quite
satisfactory methods to tackle these difficulties are available.TRANSPORTATION PLANNING IN URBAN AREAS 323
His more substantial arguments are directed against the decision
standards of "suboptimization" or the "local optimum." It is difficult
to define an optimum where a market mechanism does not exist, as is
often the case with urban services. To act in a pseudo-market context,
therefore, can be dangerous, as indeed might be an indiscriminate use
of tolls such as Vickrey proposes. In a particularly perceptive passage,
Harris warns against the dangers of suboptimization when one pro-
gram—highways, urban renewal, mortgage insurance, and so on—runs
away with metropolitan development, because it is not based to the
same extent upon a market or pseudo-market framework as other
programs.
I agree with Harris that proper markets for urban services do not
exist. Of course, if market mechanisms conforming to the economist's
rule book can be found or created, all the better.But professional
economists should be on guard against the vested intellectual interests
they have in the notion of the market, and all the formidable method-
ological apparatus it gave rise to. Simple scientific honesty compels us
to state nonmarket items in other quantitative or qualitative terms.
The frequently observed attempts to heroically translate all manner of
effects of public action into dollars and cents are to be depreciated.
Now to the core problem of suboptimization in urban decision-
making. Urban objectives have several dimensions—cultural, political,
ethical, aesthetic, economic. To pursue only one dimension would
indeed lead to a suboptimum from the total point of view. Likewise,
once the multidimensional structure of public goals has been correctly
identified, various discrete bundles of means are available. Harris uses
the suggestive idea of the "policy space" within which we must move—
not marginally, but by recombinations of policy sets.
In urban research, as in the social sciences generally, the need to
handle multidimensional problems, the irrelevance of simple dichoto-
mies, the absence of continuously variable relationships, create tough
methodological problems. How to reconcile the different objectives?
How to move up to a "higher optimum," when this is a surface rather
than a point? How to select the best policy bundle? It will certainly
be desirable to enlist the support of all relevant expertise, including
that in economics, for the purpose.Conscientious tracing of causes
and effects of various policies will be helpful.Identification of policy
trade-offs---more urban mobility may detract from social, cultural,
aesthetic desiderata, for example—will be highly illuminating.
In all this the scope for economic decisions, I believe, can best be
delineated by the distinction between ends and means to achieve ends.324 TRANSPORTATION PLANNING IN URBAN AREAS
Our urban goals are predominantly noneconomic. My good friend
Dick Carli would argue that they may not even be rational. We should
always allow for the intuitive, the romantic, the lyric, otherwise urban
life will be empty. But in the choice of human means we should
endeavor to be rational.
Consequently transportation planning in urban areas ought to be
pursued in this fashion: let a community pattern be set up as an end;
then let us devise the optimum transport system to serve it, as a means;
and then let us finally submit, for community decision-making, the
question of whether the transport requirement is unreasonable for
meeting the general community objectives.
This still begs the question how the multidimensional community
goals should be determined. Here we get into the old hassle between
"predictive" and "prescriptive" uses of economic analysis. In another
article by Harris, his attitude is made clear.Speaking of "process-
oriented" analysis, he describes a society of individuals, each attempting
to optimize the current situation, all interacting, and all subject to
resource scarcity. Given these restraints, we can analytically describe
what their behavior will be. We can alter the restraints and describe a
different pattern of behavior. Models based upon hypothesis about
how individuals optimize their economic welfare can add to our
predictive abilities.
"When we are using a model for predictive purposes," Harris
continues, "normative considerations may enter in the following way:
we may assume, for better or worse reasons, that we can specify a
manner in which people ought to behave under given circumstances,
which will coincide with the way they actually will behave. We impute
to them an optimizing behavior which will reproduce their actual
behavior." In other words, those analysts who are perceptive of values,
as well as of facts, will be better prophets. But Harris hastens to add
that he is not defining standards. The assumed behavior, he points out,
need not "coincide with any normative moral code, nor need it lead to
the fulfillment of any normative goals.it would thus appear unwise to
equate optimizing behavior with rationality, with socially ethical
behavior, or with any socially optimum results."
This may explain why Harris balks at the idea of applying economic
principles for decision-making in urban public enterprises. He would
probably not argue long against using economic welfare theory in
private enterprise, where the behavior of persons is defined by hedo-
nistic motives and constrained by market conditions. But in public
enterprise, behavior is not compelled by impersonal forces:itisTRANSPORTATION PLANNING IN URBAN AREAS 325
consciouslydirected in a particular course which reflects public choice.
Applying economic principles, we are not describing a behavioral
process, we are discussing guidelines for policy.
However, among scientifically minded people there is felt a growing
need to describe public decision-making as a process of collective
behavior, to outline the sequence of choices. This was the purpose of
Davidoff and Reiner, and they find that the identification and formu-
lation of values, goals, and objectives enters at every stage of the
process. They feel that the planner should not only be responsible for
furnishing information (including predictions about the consequences
of certain decisions), but also for the evaluation of alternative choices,
the suggestion of the best choice, the testing of values, and the identifi-
cation of goals. This describes very well, in my opinion, what econo-
mists and urban transport experts in their own professional spheres
also ought to do. We must, in Mumford's words, not only inform, but
"educate the attitude" of decision makers.